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Help to Feed the Poor in Less Developed Countries? 
By 
Donald w. Larson and Robert c. Vogel* 
An important objective of U.S. foreign policy has been to improve the 
welfare of the poor in less developed countries (LDCs). Adequate and low cost 
food supplies are a key element of this policy. It is felt that reduction of 
poverty will make the maintenance of stable democratic regimes in LDCs more 
likely. The purpose of this paper is not to question the link between reduced 
poverty in LDCs and U.S. national security interests but rather to examine 
whether cheap food and cheap credit as a means to increase food supplies have 
been appropriate instruments to reduce poverty in LDCs. 
An obvious way to help the poor in LDCs would seem to be the provision of 
additional food supplies, and this was an especially expedient policy during 
the 1960s because of the large food surpluses produced by U.S. agriculture. 
The Public Law 480 Food For Peace program was approved to provide additional 
food for the poor in LDCs; however, the program did not take into account the 
longer run impact of cheap food (food prices below market equilibrium clearing 
levels) on incentives for food production in LDCs. The provision of cheap 
food imports may not only reduce farm prices and hence the incentive to pro-
duce food but may also depress incomes in the agricultural sector where the 
-vast majority of the poor in LDCs are located. While the possibility of per-
verse incentives was recognized in some agricultural economics literature as 
early as the 1960s, it was not until the world food production shortages of 
the 1970s that the provision of cheap food by the U.S. to LDCs was drastically 
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curtailed. The first section of the present paper will not only elaborate 
these arguments but will also analyze the extent to which many LDCs may have 
continued to follow ill conceived policies of low prices for agricultural 
products in the wake of the Public Law 480 Food For Peace program. 
The depletion of U.S. food surpluses, and perhaps the criticism of P.L. 
480, has led to a shift in emphasis in U.S. policy in the 1970s toward 
encouraging agricultural production in LDCs. One of the key elements in this 
new strategy has been the provision of cheap credit (credit at subsidized, low 
rates of interest) in an attempt to promote agricultural production. Further-
more, it is widely accepted that the U.S. has abundant capital which can 
readily be injected as cheap credit in rural financial markets of LDCs. In 
this new strategy it was argued that subsidized credit could be targeted to 
the poorest farmers in order to improve the distribution of income as well as 
augmenting agricultural output. 
The second section of the present paper will argue that U.S. policies of 
subsidized, low interest rate credit for the agricultural sectors of LDCs may 
have even fewer benefits and more pernicious side effects than the Food For 
Peace programs pursued earlier. The last section of the present paper con-
tains the conclusions and will argue that neither cheap food nor cheap credit 
accomplished their objectives and that both had more negative effects than had 
been anticipated. 
Cheap Food 
The U.S. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (also 
known as Public Law 480 or Food For Peace) under which nearly $29 billion of 
food assistance has been provided to recipient countries on a concessional 
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basis has been a politically popular program in the U.S. as well as in the 
recipient countries. Within the U.S., food assistance has had strong support 
among farm groups because it represents an important outlet for farm products 
and among consumer groups because food assistance to the poor and hungry of 
the LDCs has appealed to their humanitarian values. In addition, food aid is 
popular because it is thought to be additional aid that would not otherwise be 
available from the donor country. 
There are also many arguments in favor of food aid in terms of the impact 
on the recipient countries. One of these arguments is that food aid can have 
a favorable impact on the poorest of the poor through distribution at con-
cessional prices or through food for work projects. Another argument is that 
food aid can provide financing for government develpment projects which pro-
mote economic growth and increased self reliance in the recipient country. It 
is also widely argued that food aid can assist the recipient country to accu-
mulate inventories of basic foods which can be used to stabilize farm and con-
sumer prices and to assure adequate food supplies. 
The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended, 
states that it is U.S. policy "to expand international trade; to develop and 
expand export markets for U.S. agricultural commodities; to use the abundant 
agricultural productivity of the United States to combat hunger and malnutri-
tion and to encourage economic development in the developing countries, with 
particular emphasis on assistance to those countries that are determined to 
improve their own agricultural production; and to promote in other ways the 
foreign policy of the United States."!/ Inconsistencies in the above objec-
tives are readily apparent since the expansion of export markets for u.s. 
1/ Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended 
Public Law 480,83d Congress, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 1. 
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agricultural commodities may directly conflict with efforts to improve agri-
cultural production in developing countries. P.L. 480 as amended contains 
four titles. Title I 0 covers concessional sales; Title II covers the donations 
and disaster relief; Title III, food for development and barter; and Title IV 
contains the general provisions. 
Title I sales, the most important of the four titles, are dollar credit 
sales or convertible local currency credit sales made to foreign importers, 
foreign governments, or private trade entities. Even though Title I sales are 
based upon world market prices, the sales are considered "concessional'' 
because the payment terms are more favorable than those available under 
commercial export sales •. ~/ These more favorable terms are the amount which 
can be financed (up to 95 percent of the sale), the length of the total 
repayment (up to 40 years), the grace period (up to 10 years) and the relati-
vely low interest rates charged (2 to 3 percent per year). The actual sales 
are conducted by private U.S. suppliers who obtain the financing and the com-
modity for export through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a corporate 
body within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Title I sales are restricted to "friendly countries" and the U.S. must 
take reasonable precautions to assure that sales under this title will not 
unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities or the normal patterns 
of commercial trade with friendly countries. Such a restriction, of course, 
becomes very difficult to enforce since it is likely that Title I sales will 
reduce commercial imports of the recipient country from the U.S. or other 
2/ The amount of the "concession" in P.L. 480 sales has been the object of 
much research and debate. Pinstrup-Andersen and Tweeten [1971] found that 
pricing of food aid on the basis of prevailing export prices considerably 
overstates the actual value to the recipient countries and causes unduly 
high repayment obligations. 
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countries. Another restriction is that at least 75 percent of the food aid 
provided under this title should be delivered to countries which meet the 
International Development Association poverty criterion and which are affected 
by insufficient food for immediate requirements from either domestic produc-
tion or commercial imports. 
Title II includes agricultural commodity grants to nonprofit voluntary 
U.S. relief agencies such as CARE (Cooperative for American Relief 
Everywhere), international programs such as the World Food Program, and 
government to government donations. Title II commodities may be used to meet 
famine, to combat malnutrition, to promote economic and community development, 
and for nonprofit school lunch and preschool feeding programs. In addition to 
the cost of the commodity, the CCC can pay for packaging, enrichment, preser-
vation, processing, and transportation to the foreign destination for all 
Title II commodities. 
The Food for Development Program and barter are included in Title III. 
The objective of assistance under this title "shall be to increase the access 
of the poor in the recipient country to a growing and improving food supply 
through activities designed to improve the production, protection, and utili-
zation of food, and to increase the well-being of the poor in the rural sector 
of the recipient country."~/ Under the Food for Development program, the 
funds accumulated from the local sale of Title I commodities can be credited 
to repay the loan if the funds are used for activities such as rural develop-
ment, health services, or population planning. Under the barter provisions of 
Title III, private U.S. firms under contract to the CCC were able to acquire 
foreign produced strategic materials of national security interest for U.S. 
3/ Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended 
Public Law 480,83d Congress, Washington D.C., 1979, p. 18. 
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Government stockpiles. The barter program was suspended in July 1973 at a 
time when world supplies of some major agricultural commodities were rela-
tively scarce and world prices were at record levels. 
Title IV contains the general provisions of the Act including the defini-
tion of what is an agricultural commodity and some added items such as the 
farmer-to-farmer assistance program and the research and contract agreements 
with educational institutions in the recipient countries. 
Since P.L. 480 was signed into law in 1954, some important changes in 
emphasis have been made through amendments to the act. The 1966 amendment 
made two such changes. P.L. 480 as passed in 1954 stated that it was, "the 
policy of Congress ••• to make maximum efficient use of surplus agricultural 
commodities in furtherance of the foreign policy of the United States ••• by 
providing a means whereby surplus agricultural commodities in excess of the 
usual marketings of such commodities may be sold through private trade 
channels ••• ".~/ The 1966 amendment changed this primary emphasis of the Act 
from disposal of surplus U.S. agricultural products to an emphasis on meeting 
humanitarian food needs through the use of the abundant agricultural produc-
tivity of the U.S. and encouraging long term agricultural development in the 
recipient countries. The 1966 amendment also changed the Act so that it would 
make a stronger contribution to the U.S. balance of payments position. This 
was accomplished by initiating Title I dollar credit sales and convertible 
local currency credit sales and requiring that Title I sales for local 
currency be phased out by 1971. The principal motive for passage of the 1966 
amendment reflects changes in economic conditions of the U.S. during the late 
4/ U.S. Department of Agriculture. P.L. 480 Concessional Sales, Economic 
Research Service. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 142, 
Washington, D.C., December, 1977, P• 3. 
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1950s and early 1960s rather than changes in the LDCs. Both changes were con-
venient because the large agricultural surpluses had been depleted and because 
the U.S. balance of payments needed strengthening. 
With the Bellmon amendment of 1977, the issue of the disincentive effects 
of cheap food first appeared in the language of the Act. This amendment 
states that "No agricultural commodity may be financed or otherwise made 
available under the authority of this Act except upon a determination by the 
Secretary of Agriculture that ••• the distribution of the commodity in the 
recipient country will not result in a substantial disincentive to or inter-
ference with domestic production or marketing in that country. "l../ The Bellmon 
amendment was passed in response to increased U.S. criticism of food aid 
because the disincentive effect on the recipient countries had been ignored. 
It is interesting to note that the Bellmon amendment states a general policy 
which has certainly encountered many problems of interpretation each time that 
the Secretary of Agriculture has been required to make a determination of what 
is a substantial disincentive. Furthermore, it is readily apparent that the 
Secretary of Agriculture faces a fundamental conflict of interest in making 
such a determination given that his constituency (U.S. producers) is always 
more interested in increased farm product sales rather than the impact of such 
sales on the recipient country. 
As shown in Table 1, total P.L. 480 assistance equalled nearly $29 billion 
from July, 1954 through September, 1979. Of the $29 billion, slightly over 
$20 billion were Title I sales, of which about $12 billion were local currency 
sales and $8 billion were long term dollar credit sales and convertible local 
currency sales. Title II donations comprise most of the remaining $9 billion 
5/ Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended 
Public Law 480,83d Contress, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 23. 
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Table 1: Value of u.s. Farm Products ShTpped Under PublTc 480 Chmpared With Total 
Exports of u.s. Farm Products, July 1954 through September 30, 1979* 
Year 
1955 •••••••••••••• 
1956 •••••••••••••• 
1957 •••••••••••••• 
1958 •••••••••••••• 
1959 •••••••••••••• 
1960 •••••••••••••• 
1961 •••••••••••••• 
1962 •••••••••••••• 
1963 •••••••••••••• 
1964 •••••••••••••• 
1965 •••••••••••••• 
1966 •••••••••••••• 
1967 •••••••••••••• 
1968 •••••••••••••• 
1969 •••••••••••••• 
1970 •••••••••••••• 
1971 •••••••••••••• 
1972 •••••••••••••• 
1973 •••••••••••••• 
1974 •••••••••••••• 
1975 •••••••••••••• 
1976 •••••••••••••• 
July-Sept. 1976.;. 
Oct.-Sept. 1976-77 
Oct.-Sept. 1977-78 
Oct.-Sept. 1978-79 
Total 
Publ le Law 480 
Title I 
I 
Long-term 
I Doi lar and 
Chnvertlble 
I Local 
Sales for Currency 
Local I 0-edlt 
Currency_!_/ Sa les2/ 
I 
73 
439 
908 
657 
724 
824 
951 
1,030 19 
1,088 57 
1,056 48 
1,142 158 
866 181 
803 178 
723 300 
346 427 
309 506 
204 539 
143 535 
6 661 
575 
762 
650 
316 
760 
739 
748 
12,292 8, 160 
TTtle II 
I 
Government 
to I 
Government Donat Ton 
Donat Tons I through Barter 
and World Voluntary for 
Food I Rell ef strategic 
Programs3/ ~ency,4/ mater I al s5/ 
-I 
----Ml I I Ion dollars---
52 
63 
51 
51 
30 
38 
75 
88 
89 
81 
55 
87 
110 
100 
111 
113 
138 
228 
159 
147 
148 
65 
18 
92 
112 
126 
2,427 
135 
184 
165 
173 
131 
105 
146 
160 
174 
189 
183 
180 
157 
150 
154 
128 
142 
152 
128 
145 
191 
192 
51 
250 
223 
263 
4,253 
125 
298 
401 
100 
132 
149 
144 
198 
48 
43 
32 
32 
23 
6 
1 
1, 732 
1-bt appllcable. Details may not add to totals due to rounding 
All 
Total 
Total ~rlcul-
P. L. tural 
480 Exports 
385 3, 144 
984 3,496 
1,525 4,728 
981 4,003 
1,017 3,719 
1, 116 4,519 
1,316 4,946 
1,495 5, 142 
1,457 5,078 
1,418 6,068 
1,570 6,097 
1,346 6,747 
1,271 6,821 
1,280 6,383 
1,039 5,826 
1,056 6,718 
1,023 7, 753 
1,058 8,046 
954 12,902 
867 21,293 
1, 101 21,578 
907 22,147 
385 5,355 
1, 102 23,974 
1,074 27,291 
1, 137 31, 975 
28,864 265,481 
P.L. 480 
Exports 
as a 
Percent 
of Total 
~rTcul-
tural 
Exports 
12 
28 
33 
24 
27 
24 
26 
29 
29 
23 
26 
20 
19 
20 
18 
16 
13 
13 
7 
4 
5 
4 
7 
4 
4 
4 
11 
* Oct.-Sept. 1976/77 Is the begTnnlng of the new fiscal year. fib comparison wl II be made for Oct.-Sept. 
1975/76 year. 
_!_! Authorized by Tltle I, P.L. 480. 
3f Shipments under agreements signed through Dec. 31, 1966, authorized by Tltle IV, P.L. 480. ShTpments under 
agreements sTgned from Jan. 1, 1967, authorTzed by Tltle I, P.L. 480, as amended by P.L. 89-808. 
3/ Authorized by Tltle 11, P.L. 480. Includes World Food Program. 
4/ Authorized by Section 416 of the ~rlcultural kt of 1949 and Section 302, Tltle 111, P.L. 480 through Dec. 
31, 1966. Jltrthorlzed by Title I I, P.L. 480, as amended by P.L. 89-808, effectTve Jan. 1, 1949. 
5/ Authorized by Section 303, TTtle 111, P.L. 480, and other leglslatlon. Includes some shipments Tn exchange 
for goods and servTces for u.s. agencies before 1963. 
Source: Food for Peace 1979 Annual Report on PublTc Law 480. USDA, WashTngton, o.c. 
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in total P.L. 480 assistance. P.L. 480 exports have exceeded $1 billion 
annually nearly every year since 1954 which demonstrates that this has been an 
important market for U.S. farm products. That importance reached a peak in 
1957 when P.L. 480 exports equally 33 percent of total agricultural exports 
and then declined to the 25 percent level in the 1960s. During the 1970s, 
P.L. 480 exports decreased in dollar value, especially if one considers the 
effects of inflation, and relatively from 13 percent of total agricultural 
exports to 4 percent in the late 1970s. There are two factors which largely 
explain this decreasing importance of P.L. 480. Because of poor weather in 
major producing countries, the U.S. and world food supplies decreased signifi-
cantly in 1972 and 1973 causing world food reserves to decline to low levels 
and world prices to reach record high levels. High world market prices for 
food products caused a change in U.S. agricultural exports from concessional 
sales of surplus products toward commercial sales of a scarcer more valuable 
product in world markets. In addition, world petroleum prices increased at 
extremely rapid rates during this same period so that the U.S. had no incen-
tive to sell food at concessional prices when more commercial sales were 
needed to pay for a rapidly increasing oil import bill. 
Not all farm products have benefitted equally from P.L. 480 exports; in 
fact, two products, wheat and wheat flour, represent over 46 percent of the 
total value of all P.L. 480 exports from July, 1954 through September, 1979 
(Table 2). Other important commodity exports under P.L. 480 include rice, 
soybean oil, non-fat dry milk and corn. A closer look at some of these com-
modities reveals that P.L. 480 has been the principal export market for wheat, 
rice, soybean oil and non-fat dry milk. P.L. 480 wheat exports represented 
over 60 percent of total wheat exports in the 1950s and 1960s, but declined to 
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Table 2: Value of Public Law 480 Exports by Major Commodities 
and Total, July 1, 1954, through September 30, 1979 
Commodities 
Wheat 
Wheat Flour 
Rice 
Soybean Oil 
Non-fat dry milk 
Corn 
All other commodities 
Total 
Total Public Law 480 
(Billions of Dollars) 
11.4 
2.1 
3.1 
1.9 
1.4 
1.2 
7.7 
28.8 
Percent of Total 
P.L. 480 Exports 
39.6 
7.3 
10.8 
6.6 
4.8 
4.2 
26.7 
100.0 
Source: Food for Peace 1979 Annual Report on Public Law 480. U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
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about 16 percent in the 1970s. P.L. 480 rice exports accounted for over 45 
percent of total rice exports in the 1950s and 1960s and then decreased to 
about 30 percent in the 1970s. 
The distribution of P.L. 480 assistance by major recipients demonstrates 
that the countries have been mostly Asian, some Latin American and even a few 
European (Table 3). Seven countries (India, South Korea, Pakistan, Egypt, 
Indonesia, South Vietnam and Yugoslavia) have each received over $1 billion of 
P.L. 480 assistance. Egypt has been the largest recipient of P.L. 480 
assistance since 1975, while other major recipients have been India, Indonesia 
and Bangladesh. Significant reductions in food aid to South Korea, Pakistan, 
South Vietnam, Brazil, Israel, Turkey, Morocco, Taiwan, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, 
Cambodia and Colombia have been made since 1975. The distribution of food 
assistance by major recipients suggests that a mixture of economic and 
national security interests have been important selection criteria. 
The above information clearly demonstrates that substantial amounts of 
food aid have been provided to LDCs; however, the impact of this food aid on 
the recipient countries has not been clearly demonstrated. There is a long 
history of controversy regarding the effect of food aid on prices, domestic 
output and food policy in recipient countries. When these effects are con-
sidered, the question of whether cheap food helps to feed the poor in LDCs 
becomes much more difficult to answer. 
More than twenty years ago Schultz [1960] raised the question of the 
disincentive effects on prices and output in recipient countries caused by 
P.L. 480 shipments. Fisher [1963] developed a framework which demonstrates 
that a change in production in the recipient country in response to increased 
food aid depends on the price elasticities of supply and demand in that 
12 
Table 3: Major Recipients of Public Law 480 Aid, By Selected Periods 
and Total, Fiscal Years July 1, 1954 through September 30, 
1979~./ 
Countr~ 1954-64 1965-74 1975-79 
-- Million Dollars --
India 2,084 2,933 752 
South Korea 493 1,034 385 
Pakistan 736 906 248 
Egypt 690 222 924 
Indonesia 212 757 542 
South Vietnam 130 1,307 27 
Yugoslavia 783 238 
Brazil 501 385 11 
Israel 289 375 52 
Bangladesh 66 634 
Turkey 452 218 4 
Spain 604 18 
Poland 535 33 
Morocco 97 264 110 
Italy 403 3 
Taiwan 237 158 
Chile 128 112 149 
The Phillippines 89 167 124 
Japan 367 
Tunisia 96 200 64 
United Kingdom 342 11 
Sri Lanka 56 101 45 
Cambodia 207 91 
Colombia 118 131 30 
Portugal 59 48 59 
Greece 202 43 
West Germany 212 3 
Peru 
World Total 11, 692 11,463 5,709 
Total 
5,769 
1,912 
1,890 
1,836 
1,511 
1,464 
1,021 
897 
716 
700 
674 
622 
568 
471 
406 
395 
389 
380 
367 
360 
353 
302 
298 
279 
266 
245 
215 
28,864 
a/ Includes all countries which directly received over $200 million under all 
titles of P.L. 480 -- sales, grants, and barter -- during fiscal years 
July 1954 through September 30, 1979. 
Source: Annual Reports on Public Law 480 for 1955, 1964, 1974 and 1979, and 
U.S. Agricultural Exports under Public Law 480, ERS Foreign Report 
No. 395, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1974. 
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country and the ratio of total demand to domestic supply. The price reduction 
caused by P.L. 480 shipments increases as the price elasticities of demand 
and supply becomes more inelastic and the farm output reduction increases as 
the price elasticity of supply becomes more elastic in the recipient country. 
Based on this framework, considerable empirical work has been completed 
to estimate the sign and magnitude of these elasticities in developing 
countries. Initially most of the estimates of the aggregate supply elasticity 
were generally low and positive, on the order of 0.2, so it was argued that 
P.L. 480 shipments affect domestic output only slightly even though food 
prices may decrease.~/ However, by lowering prices for food grains, the P.L. 
480 shipments cause producers to shift resources from production of food 
grains to the production of non-food products. This shift results in a change 
in the composition of farm output but total farm production does not change 
because of the highly inelastic aggregate farm supply. In this situation the 
P.L. 480 food imports may simply substitute for food which was not produced in 
the recipient country. Later, the actual magnitude of the aggregate supply 
elasticity in LDCs was questioned because the estimates tended to vary con-
siderably by country, time period and research methodology. Recently Peterson 
[1979] estimated that the aggregate agricultural supply elasticity for twenty 
seven LDCs is highly elastic, in the range of 1.25 to 1.66, which differs 
markedly from the earlier widely held view that the supply elasticity was low 
and highly inelastic. The Peterson estimate, of course, implies that the 
disincentive effect of P.L. 480 shipments on food production in the recipient 
country is much greater than what has been widely accepted among policymakers 
and researchers. 
6/ See Maxwell and Singer [1970], p. 230-231 for a discussion of these 
estimates. 
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A related issue is the effect of food aid on incomes in the agricultural 
sector where a vast majority of the poor in less developed countries are 
located. Although food aid increases the incomes of those persons who receive 
the food, this gain may be offset by the absolute fall in farm income in rural 
areas caused by the decrease in food prices due to the food assistance. For 
example, the results of earlier studies of the effects of P.L. 480 in Colombia 
by Goering [1962], Goering and Witt [1963], and Adams et al., [1963] found 
little or no effect on domestic production or prices. However, a later study 
by Dudley and Sandilands [1975] found that both production and income of 
Colombian farmers declined because of declining wheat prices caused by P.L. 
480 wheat shipments and that Colombia imported 1,400,000 tons of wheat which 
could have been produced domestically at a lower opportunity cost. Lipton 
[1977] analysed the impact of food aid on farm income in India and quotes an 
unidentified report from the U.N. office in Bangkok that the immediate loss to 
Indian farmers in the year of release, before they had time to compensate by 
switching to other crops, was equivalent to 1.9 percent of farm income between 
1957-63, 7.7 percent in 1964-67 and 1.2 percent in 1968-69. 
More difficult to analyze is the effect of food aid on the attitude and 
policies of decisionmakers toward the agricultural sector in the recipient 
country. That is, does the possibility of cheap food from P.L. 480 contribute 
to a food and agricultural policy which results in less government investment 
in and attention to the problems of food production in the recipient country? 
Does food aid contribute to a cheap food policy which depresses farm prices in 
favor of industrial prices to foster more rapid industrial growth? 
Although no research studies have systematically analyzed the relation-
ship between food aid and food policy in the recipient countries, several 
15 
studies have analyzed food price levels and agricultural price policy in LDCs. 
Peterson [1979] has recently estimated the prices received by farmers for out-
put relative to the price of a major input for 53 countries in 1968-70. llte 
results point out that real farm prices are more favorable to farmers in the 
developed countries than to farmers in the LDCs with a few possible exceptions 
including South Korea and Pakistan and that farm prices in the top ten 
countries averaged 3.7 times more than farm prices in the lowest ten. Lutz 
and Scandizzo [1980] in a study of price distortions in seven developing 
countries found substantial disincentive effects on food production because of 
heavy implicit and explicit taxation of the agricultural sector.I../ As a con-
sequence, agricultural production is discouraged, while consumption is sub-
sidized, and the opportunity for more foreign exchange earnings is lost.8/ 
Three countries (Egypt, Pakistan and Yugoslavia) of the seven in the Lutz and 
Scandizzo study have each received over $1 billion of P.L. 480 assistance. 
Thus, it is quite evident that major recipients of P.L. 480 assistance have 
followed agricultural policies which depress farm prices and discourage farm 
output. If the supply elasticity in these countries approaches that of some 
recent estimates, the loss in agricultural output would be substantial. 
Because of this loss in output, the P.L. 480 imports may have simply substi-
tuted for some food production in the recipient country which then suggests 
that cheap food may not feed the poor in LDCs. 
7/ This taxation can be accomplished explicitly through conventional taxing 
methods but more frequently is accomplished implicitly through over-valued 
exchange rates, marketing board monopolies, price controls, and import and 
export taxes. 
8/ Larson and Vogel [1980] in a study of price and price policy in Costa Rican 
agriculture found that government policy resulted in declining real farm 
prices and stagnation of farm output in the 1970s. 
16 
The above concerns have led many researchers and decisionmakers to 
question the feasibility of tied aid such as food aid a~d to suggest that 
capital assistance such as credit would be a more preferred alternative. 
Schultz [1960, p. 1023] in his pioneering study of the value of U.S. farm 
surpluses to the recipient countries states that "If these under-developed 
countries had had a choice of receiving from the United States either dollars 
or farm products of equivalent value at world prices, they would with few 
exceptions, have preferred to have the dollars because the dollars would have 
been worth more to them in achieving economic growth or in serving other pur-
poses that they ranked high among their national goals." Isenman and Singer 
[1977, p. 208] in a recent analysis of the effects of food aid also argue that 
"For this reason we favor relatively unrestricted forms of financial aid over 
food aid, even where there is no danger of a disincentive effect. It would be 
preferable to let the recipient then choose the balance between food and non-
food imports." The issues of the disincentive effects plus the more pre-
carious supply-demand balance for food grains in the 1970s have resulted in a 
movement away from P.L. 480 assistance to increased financial assistance to 
the agricultural sector of LDCs. 
Cheap Credit 
Dwindling U.S. farm surpluses, and perhaps the criticisms of P.L. 480, 
have led to a shift in emphasis in u.s. policy during the 1970s away from the 
provision of cheap food and toward programs to encourage agricultural produc-
tion in LDCs. One of the key elements- in the new U.S. strategy has been the 
provision of cheap credit for farmers in LDCs in an attempt to increase agri-
cultural output. The credit provided has been cheap in the sense that the 
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interest rates charged to farmers in LDCs are set far below the rates that 
would be determined by market forces. As shown in Table 4, the Agency for 
International Development (A.I.D.) and its predecessors provided slightly more 
than $700 million in loans and grants for agricultural credit projects in LDCs 
over the period 1950 through 1972. The majority of these resources flowed to 
Latin America, and the overall flow quickened substantially after the forma-
tion of A.I.D. in 1961. 
While no comprehensive survey of A.I.D.'s agricultural credit projects 
has been made since 1973, a summary listing of such projects suggests that the 
yearly flow of resources for agricultural credit has increased significantly 
since then. As indicated in Table 4, A.I.D. provided more than $260 million 
for agricultural credit projects in LDCs from 1974 through 1980, and there was 
an additional $910 million for projects that included significant' agricultural 
credit components but for which A.I.D.'s summary statistics do not show 
separately the exact amounts allocated to credit. In the 1974-1980 period 
grants have increased substantially relative to loans, and there has also been 
a shift away from Latin American countries which received only about one-third 
of the resources directed to agricultural credit in this later period. The 
growth over time in resource transfers must, of course, be discounted somewhat 
because inflation makes the more recent flows less valuable in real terms than 
the earlier flows. Nonetheless, the increased yearly flows of resources for 
agricultural credit projects indicate the increased emphasis of U.S. policy on 
promoting agricultural production in LDCs through the provision df cheap 
credit • .2/ 
9/ The World Bank and other international donor agencies have also followed 
the U.S. lead and have put substantial amounts into projects involving 
cheap credit for agriculture. 
Grants 
Loans 
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Table 4: A.I.D. Agricultural Credit Projects 
(millions of dollars) 
1950-1972 1974-1980 
69.5 90.0 
636.9 131.0 
Grants and Loans Not Separated 45.8 
Total 706.4 266.8 
1974-1980 ..~/ 
344.4 
263.9 
331.7 
910.0 
a/ Additional projects containing an agricultural credit component for which 
amounts allocated to agricultural credit are not shown separately in A.I.D. 
summary statistics. 
Source: A.I.D., History of A.I.D. Programs in Agricultural Credit, Spring 
Review of Small Farmer Credit, Vol. XVIII, Washington D.c., June 
1973; and A.I.D., Summary Computer Listing of Agricultural Credit 
Projects, June 1981. 
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Given the shift in U.S. policy toward encouraging agricultural output in 
developing countries, it is interesting to consider some of the reasons that 
cheap credit has come to play a key role in attempting to achieve this objec-
tive. Cheap food under P.L. 480 has been criticized because it is tied aid; 
that is, specific commodities are provided which are almost certain to be less 
valuable to an LDC than an equal amount of purchasing power that could be 
spent on whatever imports the LDC might prefer. The transfer of foreign 
exchange from the U.S. which allows LDCs to expand credit for agriculture 
while importing whatever commodities happen to coincide with the credit expan-
sion thus appears to be an ideal way to promote agricultural output in LDCs at 
minimum cost. This approach is reinforced by the view that the U.S. is a 
country with abundant capital potentially available for transfer abroad and 
that such capital can easily be injected into the rural financial markets of 
LDCs. 
The relatively straightforward idea that credit projects can allow LDCs 
to deploy more resources to increase agricultural output becomes considerably 
more complicated when coupled with the belief that credit must be cheap and 
must be targeted to specific activities and to specific groups. In spite of 
the appeal of credit because it is not tied aid, in contrast to food aid under 
P.L. 480, the view is widely held that credit is some sort of input, like seeds 
or fertilizer, that can be targeted to the production of specific crops. Such 
credit, it is said, must be cheap to overcome the many obstacles to increased 
production that confront farmers in LDCs • .!Q/ One of the main obstacles is 
thought to be the farmers themselves, especially the small traditional 
10/ In a study of Costa Rica, Larson and Vogel (1980) found that adverse 
government price policies for agricultural products can be an important 
obstacle that cheap credit policies attempt to overcome. 
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farmers, who will only be willing and able to adopt new technologies and 
purchase the necessary modern inputs if they are provided cheap credit, that 
is, at subsidized rates of interest below market rates. The implication that 
cheap credit should therefore be targeted to small farmers coincides with the 
additional objective of redistributing income to the rural poor. It is thus 
argued that cheap credit can simultaneously modernize traditional agriculture, 
increase the production of designated crops, and make the distribution of 
income less unequal in LDCs. 
There are, of course, alternative approaches LO modernizing agriculture, 
increasing production and redistributing income in LDCs, such as improved 
agricultural research and extension services, better rural infrastructure, or 
improved prices and marketing facilities for agricultural inputs and outputs. 
Projects involving cheap credit for agriculture may, however, have particular 
appeal for A.I.D. officials and for government officials in recipient 
countries. Career advancement in donor agencies may depend in part on dis-
bursing large amounts of money as rapidly as possible, so that A.I.D. offi-
cials would prefer to avoid the delays and complexities of attempting to 
resuscitate a moribund research and extension service, planning and building 
rural infrastructure, or becoming involved in the political controversies 
surrounding agricultural price policies and the roles of marketing inter-
mediaries. Such preferences are likely to be shared by government officials 
in recipient countries who would like to receive needed foreign exchange as 
quickly as possible and avoid the problems and delays involved in implementing 
complex projects or confronting powerful interest groups. 
Expediency may help to explain the popularity of projects that focus on 
cheap credit for agriculture, but such a criticism does not provide the basis 
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for an adequate evaluation. The basic issues are whether cheap credit can 
achieve the objectives of promoting agricultural production and modernization 
and improving income distribution in LDCs and whether such projects may have 
undesirable side effects. Cheap credit projects are based on the assumption 
that credit can be targeted not only to agriculture in general but also to 
specific crops and technologies as well as to small farmers. However, as Von 
Pischke and Adams (1980) among others have emphasized, one of the main proper-
ties of credit is fungibility. In fact, as already pointed out, this fungibi-
lity is a major attraction of agricultural credit projects in contrast to tied 
food aid. Because credit provides general command over resources, it cannot 
readily be tied to the production of particular crops, the adoption of par-
ticular technologies, or the purchase of particular inputs. 
Credit, even cheap credit, does not change the prices of outputs, the 
availability of inputs, or the knowledge that farmers may have of new tech-
nologies. Credit simply provides farmers with the ability to acquire addi-
tional resources to apply to whatever activities seem most attractive to these 
farmers. Diversion of credit by farmers to other than the specified activi-
ties has been found to be widespread whenever audits of credit use have been 
carried out.!_!/ More pervasive and difficult to detect than outright diver-
sion is the case in which the farmer presents the lender with his most attrac-
tive undertaking, one which would be carried out even if a loan were not 
received, and then uses the additional resources obtained with the loan for 
some unspecified activfty. These alternative activities may even be outside 
the agricultural sector or may be viewed by the lender as consumption rather 
11/ The results of these audits are rarely published because they are usually 
carried out on a confidential basis by international lending institutions. 
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than production if the fact is neglected that the farm family must continue to 
subsist while waiting for the harvest. 
In many cheap credit projects considerable attention is paid to super-
vision. Supervision is said to be necessary to provide information to farmers 
about the optimal technologies to be used and crops to be grown. This is 
likely to be worthwhile if the crops and technologies are in fact appropriate 
for the situation of the small farmer and are not based exclusively on the 
world of the agricultural experiment station. However, supervision more often 
means attempting to insure that farmers carry out the specified activities, 
allegedly so that lenders will be repaid, but primarily because lenders 
believe that farmers are irrational and untrustworthy and thus need to be told 
what to do and then forced to do it. One problem with this approach is that 
such supervision has little to do with repayment, which is more a function of 
lenders' efficiency in selecting among potential borrowers and providing good 
service to those borrowers (see Vogel, 1981). Because of fungibility, super-
vision is unlikely to direct additional resources to the specified activities 
and is likely, moreover, to be more costly than appears at first sight. 
Besides the substantial costs that supervision imposes on the lender, and also 
on the borrower as discussed below, responsibility for supervision may take 
away the best human resources that are potentially available to the agri-
cultural extension service. Such supervision may also create a suspicious and 
counterproductive relationship between farmers and field agents and may lead 
to bribery if it is worthwhile to both parties. 
Supervision in particular and high transactions costs in general often 
arise because agricultural credit is priced too low. In cheap credit pro-
jects, interest rates are set far below market levels, often even below the 
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rate of inflation, which implies a substantial excess demand for this heavily 
subsidized credit. The excess demand forces lenders to ration credit and 
encourages borrowers to bid for this credit in ways that circumvent the 
established low interest rates. An obvious way of bidding is through bribery, 
but a more honest way, although more costly to society in the use of scarce 
resources, is through increased transactions costs. Lenders require borrowers 
to prepare elaborate investment plans and follow these up with costly super-
' 
vision, even though such requirements have little to do with how the resources 
are used or whether the lender is repaid. Borrowers are willing to accept the 
costs of supervision and the preparation of investment plans as long as these 
and other transactions costs are below the interest rates and transactions 
costs that would have to be paid to obtain credit in alternative markets 
(e.g., from moneylenders). Small farmers will be the first to lose access to 
cheap credit, not because lenders refuse to give them loans, but rather 
because high fixed transactions costs make it unattractive even to apply for 
small loans (see Adams and Nehman, 1979). The failure of small farmers to be 
interested in supposedly cheap credit is often taken as evidence that small 
farmers are irrational, overly risk averse and unable to understand the 
attractions of new crops and new technologies. 
Loan guarantees are another important component of high transactions 
costs for borrowers. Even though guarantees often prove of little use in 
collecting overdue loans, they are normally required by lenders and ont ~.:!i"IT•J 
to drive away borrowers that lenders consider undesirable (see Vogel, 1981). 
Guarantees can be costly to arrange in terms of time as well as money, so that 
many potential borrowers such as small farmers do not find it worthwhile to 
incur the high fixed transactions costs often required to apply for even a 
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small loan. Legal fees to arrange guarantees may often seem unnecessarily 
high, especially when the borrower uses the same lawyer as the lender, but 
such fees can be worthwhile to the borrower if they insure a large loan at a 
low rate of interest. If land and cattle are the collateral preferred by !en-
ders, borrowers will be encouraged to bid up the prices on land and cattle 
until they offset the low interest rates on cheap credit. Sponsors of cheap 
credit proects are often concerned about stringent guarantee requirements and 
other components of high transactions costs and provide ample technical 
assistance to deal with these problems. However, the situation rarely 
improves because the cheap credit itself creates incentives to keep guarantees 
strict and transactions costs high in order to ration the excess demand for 
credit. 
Another important aspect of the rationing systems that typically develops 
to deal with the excess demand for cheap credit is a limit on the amount of 
credit that can be obtained to finance each specific commodity. If there were 
no such limits, farmers would have an incentive to ask for an unlimited amount 
to plant one acre of rice or purchase one cow in order to obtain as much of 
the credit subsidy as possible. To determine plausible credit limits, the 
usual procedure is to undertake studies of production costs for various com-
modities, and to make judgment as to what percentage of these costs should be 
financed (see Vogel and Larson, 1980). However, such studies can be compli-
cated and expensive to carry out and can yield highly uncertain results, espe-
cially when there are large numbers of different commodities produced in 
different regions using different technologies. Such uncertainty means that 
some commodities will be under-financed and others over-financed, but more 
importantly that many will not be financed at all. When a lender is 
25 
confronted with a loan application for some commodity for which production 
costs, and hence credit limits, have not been officially established, it is 
unlikely that the lender will be willing to undertake the necessary studies, 
especially when there is excess demand for cheap credit for established com-
modities. Since an important function of a financial system is to channel 
resources to new commodities, new technologies and new regions, credit 
rationing involving such limits can be a significant factor retarding innova-
tion in agriculture. 
As already indicated, an important objective of projects involving cheap 
credit for agriculture is to redistribute income toward small farmers and the 
rural poor. However, the foregoing discussion has emphasized that high trans-
actions costs and other devices which arise to ration cheap credit are likely 
to bear most heavily on small farmers. In many agricultural credit projects, 
moreover, lenders are required to charge lower rates of interest for small 
farmers than the rates established for other classes of agricultural borrowers 
and this can provide a strong incentive for lenders not to serve small far-
mers. The available evidence substantiates that the vast majority of small 
farmers and other rural poor in LDCs receive no cheap credit and hence none of 
the credit subsidy (see Gonzalez-Vega, 1981). Among those who receive cheap 
credit, there is a high concentration of large loans to relatively wealthy 
borrowers, and in one case studied intensively the concentration of credit is 
even greater than the concentration of land holdings or income distribution 
(see Vogel, 1977). These favored recipients of cheap credit benefit not only 
from the subsidy component, which is often substantial, but also from more 
rapid income growth based on access to credit, a benefit which can be even 
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more substantial if investments with significant rates of return are available 
(see Gonzalez-Vega, 1981). 
It is often argued that state-owned development banks will not ration 
credit in the ways described above because they are not profit oriented. 
However, the continuing existence of these lending institutions is necessarily 
contingent on profits and losses. Lending costs, interest income, and 
delinquency rates cannot be ignored if state-owned development banks are to 
have funds to lend beyond the initial injection of funds from their government 
or some international donor. Moreover, governments and international donors 
often impose performance criteria on these lenders, such as preservation of 
capital and control of delinquency, which are essentially profit maximizing 
criteria. It is also important to ask what motivates the behavior of 
employees of state-owned development banks. Unfortunately, little research 
has been carried out on such behavior, but salary and related benefits are 
almost certain to be important for these employees. Unless proponents of 
cheap credit through state-owned development banks can develop alternative 
performance criteria and implement such criteria through specific incentives 
to employees, statements that state-owned development banks beha7e differently 
from profit-maximizing commercial banks cannot be taken seriously. It has 
only recently come to be recognized that small farmers do not behave irra-
tionally and it now needs to be recognized that bank employees are likewise 
aware of and interested in their own welfare. 
The foregoing discussion strongly suggests that projects based on cheap 
credit for agriculture in LDCs have not achieved their main objectives of 
modernizing agriculture, increasing output and redistributing income to the 
rural poor. The evaluation of cheap credit projects must also take into 
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account the possibility of undesirable side effects, such as the problems 
created for the functioning of the agricultural extension service discussed 
above. Perhaps the most pernicious side effect is that financial institutions 
lose any incentives to mobilize voluntary savings in their own countries (see 
Vogel, 1981). When cheap resources are available from international donors, 
governments and central banks, financial institutions are discouraged from 
paying the interest rates and providing the services necessary to attract 
deposits, even though there is widespread evidence of substantial savings 
potential in LDCs (see Adams, 1978). Furthermore, the requirement that credit 
be cheap makes it difficult for financial institutions to lend profitably any 
deposits mobilized domestically. The bias against mobilizing voluntary 
savings places a particular burden on the rural poor in LDCs. Even with this 
bias, the number of small deposit accounts at typical financial institutions 
in LDCs vastly exceeds the number of loans. The poor must hold some liquid 
reserves in order to meet emergencies, while the nonpoor usually have the 
options of investing in real assets, indulging in capital flight or otherwise 
avoiding the restrictions that keep interest rates low on deposits. The rural 
poor are likely to gain more from improved savings opportunities than they 
have from any cheap credit project yet devised. 
The failure to mobilize voluntary domestic savings also adversely affects 
the viability of financial institutions in LDCs (see Bourne and Graham, 1981). 
These institutions forego important information about the savings behavior of 
potential borrowers, information that can be vital in judging probable 
repayment performance. Depending for funds on the changing tastes of inter-
national donors and governments, even when these donors and governments are 
generous, presents a continuing cycle of feast and famine resulting from the 
I 
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inevitable delays even in simple follow-on projects. Such cycles diminish the 
image of these institutions as good credit sources, thereby reducing incen-
tives for borrowers to repay in order to maintain a good credit rating. When 
more cheap credit is available from governments and donors, financial insti-
tutions may lose interest in pursuing delinquent borrowers, and this leads 
governments and donors to impose the kinds of performance criteria discussed 
above. 
Cheap credit together with government directives to allocate credit to 
specified activities in the agricultural sector give policymakers the mistaken 
impression that they are achieving certain production and income distribution 
objectives (Vogel and Larson, 1980). Because of the subsidy component, 
borrowers have an incentive to acquire cheap credit. Because credit is 
fungible as explained above, borrowers and lenders will generally be able to 
report that credit was allocated according to the government's directives 
regardless of how borrowers actually used the additional resources acquired 
with the credit. The government's directives thus create information for 
policymakers about credit use, and hence resource allocation, that is likely 
to be highly misleading. If government policymakers believe that they are 
promoting specified activities in the agricultural sector through cheap credit 
when they are not, they may be led to neglect basic problems such as the agri-
cultural research and extension service, rural infrastructure or the prices 
and markets for agricultural inputs and outputs. 
Conclusions 
Improving the welfare of the poor in LDCs has been an important objective 
of U.S. foreign policy and a key element in this policy has been adequate and 
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low cost food supplies. Since the 1950s, cheap food and cheap credit have 
successively been the primary instruments in the attempt to increase food 
supplies and reduce poverty in LDCs. However, neither cheap food nor cheap 
credit has been found to be successful in achieving U.S. policy objectives and 
both appear to have had harmful side effects on recipient countries. 
Perhaps no foreign assistance legislation has generated as much debate as 
P.L. 480 even though food aid appears to be an obvious way to feed the poor in 
LDCs. Criticism began shortly after P.L. 480 was passed in 1954 because the 
primary emphasis seems in fact to have been the disposal of large U.S. agri-
cultural surpluses rather than any great concern over feeding the poor in 
LDCs. Although the act was later amended to increase emphasis on assistance 
to those countries which are determined to expand their own food production, 
P.L. 480 has continued to be an important outlet for u.s. farm products, espe-
cially wheat. 
While P.L. 480 provides additional food for the LDCs in the short ~n, 
the longer run impact of cheap food on incentives for food production in LDCs 
was not adequately considered. The long run harmful effects of cheap food 
consist not only in lower farm prices, and hence reduced incentives to produce 
food in LDCs, but also in support for government policies in LDCs that 
discourage agricultural development. Earlier research results suggested that 
lower food prices would not lower aggregate farm output significantly because 
farmers were not responsive to price changes and at worst would only shift 
production away from the type of crops provided under P.L. 480. However, 
lower food prices have recently been found to have a much larger depressing 
effect on aggregate farm production in LDCs. In addition, cheap food supports 
government policies toward agriculture in many LDCs that depress farm prices, 
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discourage farm output and tax agriculture to favor industrial growth. 
Besides the adverse direct and indirect effects of cheap food on agricultural 
production, cheap food may also have reduced the income of the numerous rural 
poor in LDCs who produce the types of crops supplied under P.L. 480. 
The shift in U.S. policy toward encouraging agricultural production in 
LDCs has placed particular emphasis on providing cheap credit to farmers as a 
means of increasing output while also redistributing income to the rural poor. 
This new strategy assumes that credit can be targeted to agriculture and 
within agriculture to specific commodities, modern technologies and poor 
farmers. However, cheap credit fails to accomplish these objectives because a 
main property of credit is fungibility. Because credit provides general com-
mand over resources, it cannot readily be tied to the production of specified 
commodities, the adoption of particular technologies or to low income farmers. 
Use of credit for other than the specified activities has been found to be 
widespread even though lenders have supervised credit use in an attempt to 
insure that farmers carry out the specified activities. 
Low, subsidized rates of interest on credit result in an excess demand 
for cheap credit which must be rationed among the potential borrowers. 
Excessive supervision, stringent loan guarantees, and other requirements 
imposed on borrowers result in high transaction costs which have evolved into 
the primary rationing device for cheap credit. These high transaction costs 
bear most heavily on small borrowers with the result that the vast majority of 
small farmers receive no cheap credit and hence no credit subsidy. The evi-
dence from various LDCs also indicates that credit rationing results in the 
concentration of cheap credit in large loans to relatively wealthy borrowers 
with further perverse implications for income distribution. In addition to 
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the failure to achieve the policy objectives, cheap credit has various unde-
sirable side effects such as credit limits for different commodites which 
discourage innovation in agriculture and the misdirected supervision which 
undermines the agricultural extension service. The most important undesirable 
side effect is the incentive for financial institutions in LDCs not to 
mobilize voluntary domestic savings which is not only especially biased 
against the rural poor but also threaten the long run viability of financial 
institutions and encourages their dependency on governments and international 
donors. 
The failure of cheap food and cheap credit policies to help feed the poor 
in LDCs should cause policymakers to search for other approaches to this 
problem. However, cheap food and cheap credit often seem to be achieving 
their objectives. It is continually argued that cheap food from the U.S. must 
expand the availability of food for the poor in LDCs, which seems plausible 
until the long run effects are considered. Cheap credit always seems to be 
allocated according to government targets until the overriding importance of 
credit rationing and fungibility is recognized. The illusion that something 
is being done for agriculture and for the poor i~ LDCs often distracts policy-
makers from attacking more difficult and more basic problems such as improving 
the agricultural research and extension service, building better rural 
infrastructures, and dealing with agricultural price policies and marketing 
facilities. 
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